I posted about Bertrand Russell’s teapot argument a while back, but it’s been resurrected to my attention recently by some random blog post I read that voiced support of his argument in passing. In reading the post (it was more of a quasi-academic article than something linkable, and I have no idea where I came across it anymore) and the documented comments brought up even more thoughts.
Russell’s teapot is really a criticism of the burden of proof for an empirical claim. Even if a supernaturalist makes the teapot claim, and even if it’s based on his religious beliefs, the criticism says nothing about the truth of those religious beliefs necessarily.
The evidence of the cosmic teapot would have to exist somewhere in some manner and be apprehended by someone: someone had to make the teapot, send it into space (or let it float out the airlock). Someone knows it’s up there. This is a burden of proof scenario that it (literally) worlds apart from supernatural knowledge.
This brings up another issue. Russell is implicitly proposing a level of technology in which a small teapot can be sent into orbit but can’t be detected. I generally despise useless hypotheticals when they don’t conform to statistical likelihoods. People navigate the physical world based on what’s most likely to happen. That’s why I really don’t care for the question whether it’s more ethical to divert a runaway train so that it kills 20 babies instead of 20 nuns. There’s no falling piano insurance.
This constant dragging of every claim into the realm of empiricism is getting annoying.